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BOOK REVIEWS
By Yale Kaaisar. Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 1980. Pp. xx, 323.
$17.50.
POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS.

Reviewed by Hon. Samuelj Roberts'
"A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his influence
stops."
Henry Adams
When the subject of police interrogation and confessions is mentioned, there come to mind many cases-Mirandav. Arizona, 2 Escobedo
v. llinois,3 Massiah v. UnitedStates 4 and Brewer v. Williams 5-to name
just a few. There also come to mind many issues--Was there custodial interrogation? Had formal proceedings commenced? Was there
a knowing and intelligent waiver?
But there comes to mind only one scholar-Yale Kamisar. For
he is the true teacher who, since even before the first rumblings of the
"criminal procedure revolution," has fought convincingly to show
students, professors, prosecutors, judges, and police not only the
problems that exist, but their possible solutions. It is indeed a professional privilege to review some of the scholarly writings of Professor
Kamisar, and it is with sincere thanks to the Lawyer that I offer these
thoughts on Police Interrogation and Confessions.
Anyone familiar with his many works can attest that Yale
Kamisar is no ordinary writer. He is a jurisprudential philosopher
skilled in the art of communication and ideas. He is also a legal
scholar who understands that effective critique of any judicial decision requires knowledge of exactly what the case holds. Thus, before
using the Supreme Court's "interrogation-confession" cases as evidence of the need for improvement of the law, Professor Kamisar
analyzes these cases thoroughly. His in-depth analyses are rich with
6
textual footnotes for the assiduous student.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
430 U.S. 387 (1977).
One could wish, however, that Professor Kamisar had not chosen to place only some of
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Yale Kamisar, however, goes beyond an historian's overview of
15 years of critical developments in constitutional law and beyond an
academician's dissection of Supreme Court decisions, their rationales
and incongruities. He is an advocate. Collected in Police Interrogation
and Confessions are seven superb essays, probing the perplexing and
always controversial questions suggested by the book's title.
It is not surprising that those who turn to Police Interrogationand
Confessions for quick, easy explanations are likely to be disappointed.
The subject of interrogation and confessions, among the most highly
disputed in the law, lends itself to few, if any, "black letter" solutions.
However, the difficulty of the area does not deter Professor Kamisar,
who, through detailed analyses, strives in the interest of society to
balance the needs of law enforcement with the rights of citizens
accused.
Before Miranda, Kamisar wrote "What is an 'Involuntary' Confession?" calling for the abrogation of the "voluntariness" test. In
this first essay he describes the test as not only "loose and unrevealing" but also "downright misleading" (p. 15). He calls for a "more
direct approach" which focuses on the risk of untrue confessions and
the offensiveness of police interrogation methods (p. 25).
Professor Kamisar knows that the foundations of the "voluntariness" test, like the rationale of a judicial decision, must be understood
before the standard can be successfully attacked. Thus, in "Equal
Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure," Kamisar addresses the invisibility and secrecy of the interrogation process and the "necessity" for questioning a suspect without
advising him of his constitutional rights-factors which permitted
the "voluntariness" test to survive.
The "Gatehouses and Mansions" essay, a foundation for the Miranda decision, contrasts
the largely unregulated and unscrutinized practices in the police
station-the "gatehouse," where ideals are checked at the door and
"realities" are faced-with the proceedings in the courtroom - the
"mansion," where the defendant is "even dignified, the public invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor of individual freedom from
law enforcement celebrated." (pp. xi-xii, 31-32).
Professor Kamisar criticizes the "legal mind" which would argue
that because police questioning does not involve any judicial process
for taking testimony, there is no compulsion to which the privilege
his notes beneath the text while placing others at the end of the book. Many of the endnotes
substantially amplify the text and deserve to be more accessible to the reader.
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against self-incrimination applies, even though evidence so obtained
is subsequently brought into the courtroom (p. 32). In painting his
picture of the "gatehouse," he reminds us that "as lawyers and
judges" we often forget "what we know as men" (p. 37).7
So long as "what on their face are merely words of request take
on color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor"; so
long as his interrogators neither advise him of his rights nor permit
him to consult with a lawyer who will; can there be any doubt that
many a "subject" will assume that the police have a legal right to an
answer? That many an incriminating statement will be extracted
under "color" of law? So long as the interrogator is instructed to
"get the idea across. . . that [he] has 'all the time in the world"'; so
long as "the power [legal or otherwise] to extract answers begets a
forgetfulness of the just limitations of the power" and "the simple
and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to
bullying and to physical force"; can there be any doubt that many
a subject will assume that there is an extralegal sanction for contumacy? (p. 37).8

Professor Kamisar also criticizes the "legal mind" which would
argue that a suspect "waives" his privileges against self-incrimination
when he "volunteers" answers to police questions. For Kamisar, that
waiver argument is, as it should be, hardly worthy of retort. Kamisar
needs only to quote from Escobedo v. Illinois: "'[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of
their constitutional rights' " (p. 38). 9

The remaining essays in Police Interrogation and Confessions were
written after the Miranda decision. In these essays, Professor Kamisar
praises Miranda, noting that "[w]hatever its shortcomings, Miranda
tried to take the 'police interrogation'-'confession' problem by the
throat" (p. 223). However, he does not merely extol the virtues of

Miranda. Nor does he simply argue that Miranda and related decisions-such as Massiah v. UnitedStates and Brewer v. Williams-fail to
go far enough. He uses these cases as his arsenal in a continuing
assault on the "voluntariness" test.
In this post-Miranda era, where the social order is faced with
steadily increasing crime, the hasty and all too frequent response is to
attack "technicalities" in the law. Kamisar uses the case records to
convince us that the solution does not lie in moving backward by
7
8

(footnote omitted).
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

9 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
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adopting an approach to interrogations and confessions that has been
tested and has failed. As he recently observed, "You don't solve the
problem by eliminating procedural safeguards."' 0 Rather, the solution lies in breathing life into Miranda with new techniques, such as
those he proposes, that will accommodate both legitimate police investigative needs and equally legitimate needs of the accused citizen
and society to be free from police overreaching. Professor Kamisar's
relentless assault on the "voluntariness" test, a reminder of the injustices prior to Miranda, must be regarded as the most valuable contribution of his essays.
Kamisar is not comforted by the apparent abandonment of the
"voluntariness" test in Miranda. He is keenly aware that " '[h]owever
great the triumph, it is ephemeral. Without further struggle, it withers and dies'" (p. xx).II Immediately after Miranda, realizing that
the majority opinion would be subjected to "microscopic analyses
and relentless, probing criticism" (p. 41), Professor Kamisar turns to
the dissenting opinions to assure that their more substantial weaknesses do not escape scrutiny. "A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents"
demonstrates both that application of the privilege against self-incrimination to police interrogation is a natural, historically supported counterpart of the privilege as applied in the courtroom and
that the "voluntariness" test is unworkable and ineffective. For Professor Kamisar, Davis v. North Carolina,12 decided one week after Miranda, is the "strongest evidence" (p. 73) of the worthlessness of the
"voluntariness" test. Notwithstanding the extraordinary facts of record evincing the intention of police to deny the accused his constitutional rights, the state courts and two lower federal courts had held
the confession to be voluntary. Although the Supreme Court reversed the finding of "voluntariness," Kamisar uses the reversal to
make his point. He asks: "How many garden-variety criminal defendants who cried 'coerced confession' but lost the 'swearing contest'
below were likely to survive the winnowing process above?" (p. 75).

He answers with the history of cases: in the thirty years preceding
Miranda the Supreme Court reviewed an average of only one state
confession case per year, and in two-thirds of the confession cases
which the Court chose to review, as in Davis, the death penalty had
been imposed (p. 75).
10 TIME, February 23, 1981, at 81.
11

Kamisar is quoting Allen, On Winning and Losing, in LAW,

TION 16 (1979).

12

384 U.S. 737 (1966).

INTELLECT, AND EDUCA-
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As strong evidence as Davis v. North Carolina provides for the ineffectiveness of the "voluntariness" test, Kamisar builds his case further
in "Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record." His
comprehensive examination of the record in Brewer v. Williams unearths subtle, yet substantial, discrepancies-never discussed by any
court-between trial testimony and testimony at the preliminary
hearing, and graphically reveals the potential for injustice when a
record is not properly scrutinized.
Brewer is also naked proof of the need for an objective, reliable
record, one that does not depend upon imperfect, even if honest,
recollections of critical events. Without such a record, resolution of
the issue of "voluntariness" through a trial "waged by the crude,
clumsy method of examination, cross examination, and redirect is almost bound to be unsatisfactory." (p. 131). Indeed, as Professor
Kamisar convincingly demonstrates, the "swearing contest" between
the accused and his interrogators which accompanies the "voluntariness" test is routinely, almost inevitably lost by the accused.
"Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?" criticizes the Massiah-Williams doctrine (right to counsel attaches when adversary proceedings
commence) and the New York Donovan-Arthur-Hobson rule13 (right to
counsel attaches when counsel first communicates with police that he
represents the suspect) as band-aid approaches that, like the "voluntariness" test, do not cure but only hide from public view abuses in
the conduct of interrogations. These "haphazard" approaches (p.
222) not only depend upon fortuitous circumstances, subject to possible manipulation by law enforcement officials; they are also substantially unrelated to "the 'overall fairness' of the 'interrogation' and the
inherent coercion or potential for coercion in the situation" (p.
4
211).1
Professor Kamisar's solutions-tape-recorded interrogations and
confessions, and the right to counsel whether or not adversary proceedings have begun and whether or not the suspect has previously
retained a lawyer-seek to assure that the criminal justice system not
only satisfies outward symbols of fairness but is fundamentally fair.
As his final essay concludes, "[s]ymbols are important, but more is
needed" (p. 224).1 5
13 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976); People v.
Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13
N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
14 (footnote omitted).
15 Professor Kamisar's primary proposal, tape-recording of police interrogations and con-
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No greater tribute to Professor Kamisar's scholarship can be
found than the impact of his writings on the Supreme Court itself.
That he influenced the Court in Miranda in its extension to the "gatehouse" of the protections accorded in the "mansion" must be obvious. So too, since Miranda, the influence of Kamisar has been
pervasive. Recently, the Supreme Court has turned to "Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It
Matter?" for assistance in analyzing two of its own "interrogationconfession" cases. In Rhode Island v. Znnis, t 6 Kamisar's analysis of
Brewer was cited for the proposition that because Brewer was decided
on sixth amendment right to counsel grounds, the Court was incorrect to focus upon whether the Christian burial speech was interrogation-an inquiry relevant only to a fifth amendment-Miranda
analysis. 17 Citing Kamisar, the Court also reaffirmed its holdings in
Masstah that the sixth amendment right to counsel "prohibits law
enforcement officers from 'deliberately elicit[ing]' incriminating information from a defendant in the absence of counsel after a formal
charge against the defendant has been filed." '
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens went even further in
relying upon Professor Kamisar. Justice Stevens urged that the "deliberately elicited" standard of police conduct must apply both
where the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel has attached
and where, as in Innis, the accused has invoked his fifth amendment
right to counsel after Miranda warnings have been given. "In both
cases the police [have] an unqualified obligation to refrain from trying to elicit a response from the suspect in the absence of his
fessions, is directed at the cause of the "swearing contest" that took Brewer v.Williams through
five courts in eight years: secrecy of police proceedings. In a "friendly" essay dedicated to an
old adversary, FredE.Inba,, The Importance ofBeing Guilty, Kamisar credits Inbau with having
ironically spawned articulate spokesmen for reforms in the area of police interrogations and
confessions, including the elimination of secrecy (p. 106-10).
Kamisar's other suggestion, that the police should not be able to obtain waivers of constitutional rights without the advice or presence of counsel, and perhaps without the advice or
presence of a judicial officer, is geared to "accommodate both the government's need for
evidence and a suspect's need for 'a lawyer's help,' which may be as great, or greater, before
the commencement ofjudicial proceedings as afterwards" (p. 211). In Kauper's 'udicial Eraminationofthe Accused" Forty Years Later- Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, Kamisar goes far
in suggesting that, if police interrogations were conducted in a counselled proceeding before a
judicial officer, silence of an accused could constitutionally be used against him. Although
not immune from legitimate criticism, this proposal further manifests his continuing effort to
resolve the many competing interests at stake.
16 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
17 Id. at 300 n.4.
18 Id
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attorney."1 9

In UnitedStates v. Heny, 20 Kamisar's analysis of Brewer was again
cited, this time by the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, for the
proposition (undisputed by the majority) that the sixth amendment
right to counsel is violated when the government deliberately elicits
21
incriminating statements after adversary proceedings have begun.
Unfortunately, while the Supreme Court has looked to Professor
Kamisar for technical assistance, the Court has not always fully applied his analysis. Thus, in Rhode Island v. Innis, even though the
Court relied upon Professor Kamisar's explication of case law, it nevertheless denied relief on a record which, under Kamisar's analysis,
22
would reveal a clear violation of the right to counsel.
3
Last Term, however, in Estelle v. Smith 2 and Edwards v.Arizona,24
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of the right to counsel
under both the fifth and sixth amendments, with all members of the
Court agreeing that the accused in each case was entitled to relief. In
Estelle v.Smith, the Court held that the results of a pre-trial psychiatric examination, at which the accused had been neither informed of
his Miranda rights nor afforded his sixth amendment right to counsel,
could not be introduced at the sentencing stage of trial.2 5 In Edwards
v. Arizona, the Court went even further in applying Miranda and implicity affirmed much of Kamisar's analysis. There, the Court addressed the issue of when interrogation may take place once an
19 Id. at 310 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also White, Rhode Island . Innis: The Significance ofa Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (1979), upon
which Justice Stevens also relies.
For Professor Kamisar, once the Miranda right to counsel has been invoked, the question
is not simply whether police have deliberately elicited a statement, but whether the accused's
assertion of his right to counsel has been "scrupulously honored." See Remarks of Professor
Kamisar at the First Annual Supreme Court Review and Constitutional Law Symposium,
repintedin THE SUPREME COURT:

TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1978-80, at 186-88, 204

(1979).
20 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by White, J.). The majority, although not citing
Kamisar directly, reaffirmed this proposition by relying upon Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
at 300 n.4, which had itself cited Kamisar, Brewer . Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is
"Interrogation'. When Does It Matter? Heng,, 447 U.S. at 271.
22 See note 19 supra. In Innis, after the suspect had been taken into custody and had
invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel, the police refrained from express questioning.
However, they conversed in the suspect's presence, stating that if they did not find the
weapon a handicapped "little girl" might find the weapon and hurt herself. Thereupon the
suspect immediately offered to show the police the location of the weapon.
23 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
24 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981).
25 101 S. Ct. at 1875-1877.
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accused has invoked his Miranda right to counsel. The Court held
that, once invoked, the Miranda right to counsel is violated when the
police themselves initiate interrogation of the accused. 26 Further interrogation is permissible only after the accused either has been afforded counsel or has himself initiated the discussion. Thus,
although not expressly citing Kamisar, the Court applied a standard
similar to that which Kamisar articulates in "Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?":
"Once the suspect has exercised his right to counsel, and thus
brought the 'second level' Miranda safeguards into play, the issue is
no longer simply whether 'interrogation' then occurred, but whether
'the exercise of the right' was 'scrupulously honored'" (p. 208).27
Although the Supreme Court has often condemned blatant police and prosecutorial interferences with the attorney-client relationship, as in Massiah, Brewer, and Heng, the Court has not always
heeded Kamisar's admonition that the fair and equal administration
ofjustice demands more than a" 'symbolic response' to the violation
of the symbol of a fair trial" (p. 217). However, Estelle and Edwards
suggest that the Court has begun to recognize and prevent opportunities for secret compulsion of the accused--opportunities which previously have gone uncorrected, as in Innis. 'As Professor Kamisar
illustrates through case histories, our constitutional guarantees of life
and liberty are only as secure as the procedural safeguards that surround them. Thus, procedures for finding "truth"-whether in the
"gatehouse" or in the "mansion"-must not only appear fair; they
must be fair. Our courts, charged with supervising the fair and equal
administration of the law, must no longer ignore the truth which objective recording of interrogations and confessions would reveal.
Only when an objective, reliable record is assured can "[t]he public
conscience. . . be satisfied that fairness dominates the administra'28
tion of justice.
Police Interrogation and Confessions is indeed the product of a servant of the law. It is the work of a man who clearly believes that
"[t]he quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by
26
27

101 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
(footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, citing

Kamisar, Brewer v. Williamr, Massiah, and Miranda: What is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Mat-

ter?, recently distinguished between "first level" and "second level" Miranda safeguards in
United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42 (1981). Adopting Kamisar's approach, the court
held the defendant's statement to police inadmissible on the ground that police had not "scrupulously honored" the defendant's assertion of her Miranda right to counsel.
28 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
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the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal laws."' 29 That
quality will no doubt continue to be improved by the influence of
Yale Kamisar.

29

Schaefer, Federa/ism and State Cn'minal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956).

